THE INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY THE OVER TURKISH POLITICS
OCTOBER 21, 2004
By Sedat BOZKURT
One of the most heatedly debated political topics of this region has been the influence exerted upon the politics by the military. This is not limited to the Republican period only. Since the Ottoman times it has not been discussed only but was experienced also as observed in the cases of Othman the Young and the Union and Progress. The Ottomans set up war colleges with the aim of driving the Military out of the Palace.

The interest of the militry as to how the country should be run persisted even though military intervention in politics assumed different forms. One of these forms, the “ Young Officers” , has even become a secondary part of politics. One would even feel its absence whenever they failed to show their “sensitivity “ regarding a certain matter.

We discussed manners in which coups d’etat took place as well as the coups themselves. The first discussion took place over the form of the 27 May coup. A truck full soldiers entered the Radio House and the Revolution was announced. Power changed hands, politicians were arrested and some of them were eventually hanged. The March 12 Coup was effected through a letter. The power changed. The September 12 Coup was similar to the May 27 Coup. Yet, this time, military trucks came to the TV Broadcasting Station as well as the Radio House. Revolution was announced by both of them. Consequently power changed hands, political bans were forced, lots of people hanged. The 28 February Coup was qualified as a post-modern coup by its authors. The primary components of which were not the military but the “vigilant forces”. The military was involved in the process to such an extent as to make tanks march in Sincan.Yet chief actors were not soldiers, but the circles of the Capital and some civilian NGO’s. This Coup took some time to get itself established. But at the end the power changed. What characterize the February 28 Coup is the statements made by the top commanders at the end of the process. In such statements it was underlined that the February 28 Coup, qualified as a post-modern Coup, was said to be a process still ongoing. In other words, it was stressed that, though less invisible than before, military influence had acquired some “continuity”.

This continuity manifested itself in the non-attendance on the part of the military in the official reception given on the occasion of the anniversary of the National Assembly on April the 23 rd and in the objections raised against some of the adaptation acts passed by the Parliament. The official call on the Speaker in order to congratulate him lasted only several minutes and the congratulatory visit paid to Erdoğan was also limited to minutes. It’s worth noting that the unexpected visit paid to the Republican People’s Party, taking place immediately after the said one, lasted quite longer and witnessed long chats. This visit was an interesting one, for for the first time the door of the politics was knocked on by the military as against the former practice in which the military is usually called on by politicians. It was clear that the Military intended to show the place from where it would manifest its sensitiviüies from then on. Nonetheless it proved to be inconsequential. The ground of “discomfort of Young Offiers” continued to remain in practice.

As a matter of fact, the existence of a military influence upon Turkish politics is not due to its effort but because of the vacuum created in politics. If the political attitude towards the Military remains hanging in emptiness, then it is only normal for the military to fill this emptiness in an habitual and enforced move. That is to say that the military is willing to be a political part of the power in all circumstances and thus maintain the reason for its existence.

Therefore, the military is perhaps more equipped and ready for action than all the other primary and secondary components of the politics. For instance, among the most important items to be given consideration in combatting the reaction , brought forward in the process of February the 28th, there was the issue of the Qor’an courses and the Schools for Training Imams and Orators. Many failed to realize the reason why importance had been attached to this issue. It became clear when the results of the 2002 General elections were read together with a Prospective Study done by the General Staff in 1997. The said report stated that the political parties on the basıs of the so-called Milli Görüş (National View) would come to power in 2002 winning 34 per cent of the votes cast thanks to the then existent Qor’an courses and graduates of the Schools for Training Imams and Orators (STIO). The percentage of the votes cast in 2002 in favour the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was foreseen already in 1997. The basis used in calculating the percentage was pointed out to clearly: the then existing Qor’an courses, STIO graduates and religious minded electors that would graduates from STIO’s. The Prospective Study adds that, if the establishment is not intervened, political parties following the line of the so-called National View will get 66 per cent of the votes to be cast in 2006.

Now, keeping this fact in view , is it possible to think the acts passed by the Parliament in the process of February the 28 th in order to combat the Reaction under a certain degree of pression exerted by the National Security Board (MGK) are quite apart from politics The then calculations was not perhaps enough to keep the AKP and other Nationalist View Parties away from power, but one could now say that there might be a serious measure devised in connection with the 2005 elections. Such preparations made by the Military cannot be thought of by a political party. This fact seems to place the military above all the political structures in political life. The military made a similar thing when it placed idealist mobs (ülkücü mafias) on top as a potential source of threat in an evaluation of the geometrically increasing Kurdish population and potential sources of threats.

The conclusion is that it is not a new thing and observation to say that the military is a component of political life. A new and important assessment is to say that whenever and wherever the military intervenes it produce a new policy. And this newly produced policy has always been a right of the center policy. May the 27th deleted the Democrat Party , a center party, and produced the Justice Party headed by Demirel. If the political life of the country had been let run its natural course, Democrat Party would have been eliminated and the middle class represented by Democrat Party would have lost its religious and nationalist sensibilities and would have perhaps gone to extreme points. They were likely to turn to the left, for political conjecture was then leftwards. The rising of the Turkish Labour Party in the succeding period and certain pro-revolutionary provisions placed in the 1961 Constitution points out to this leftward trend.

The following coup d’etat taking place on March the 12th proved to be a golden opportunity presented to the right although it was presented as a move against the Right. For it smashed the left in fact. The fact that it was not realised by a civilian actor but by the military was again beneficial to the Right. Tha March 12 Coup further marginalised the left and produced the right policy again.

As for the September 12 Coup, it was nothing but a project to smash the left as well as to produce again a political mentality saying “I went six times came back seven times.” It was in this period that not only the Center but also the pro-religious sector was created. Resorting to religion in every field was legalised since a serious “threat” was needed to allow the system to encroach upon politics. That is the product of the September the 12th period. The February 28 Coup is nothing but an attemp to “domesticate” this threat. This Coup also produced a new policy in the sense that it reformed the political structure of the Political Islam if not of the Center-Right. It might have accelerated its exhaustion as well to a certain extent.

Nowadays one thinks that the influence of the military on politics is less than before. Oni might explain it away through the EU process. Yet it shouldn’t be forgotten that EU and USA are now able to get what they want over political powers. But tomorrow, no matter how they are powerful, political powers may fail to carry out many thing despite their grass roots. For instance sending troops to Iraq in today’s circumstances What would happen if political powers and political structures prove to be unable to carry it out and if some powers deem it a must for Turkish troops to be sent to Iraq? Then the decision to send Turkish troops to Iraq would fall on the shoulders of the military. And political life would continue to flow its course on a political model designed to rotate on a military axis….